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BANKS AND BANKING - DuTY OF DEPOSITOR TO DETERMINE STATUS
OF Hrs AccouNT - Plaintiff's bookkeeper, who, as defendant bank admittedly
knew, had authority only to indorse and deposit commission checks to plaintiff's
account, embezzled considerable money between 1926 and 1931 by taking
some of the proceeds in cash or drafts. In the passbook and in defendant's own
records only the net transactions, not the total -amount of the checks, were
recorded. Plaintiff discovered the fraud in 1936 and now sues the receiver five
years after the bank closed. Held, that plaintiff, charged with constuctive knowledge of the fraud, which reasonable examination would have revealed, is guilty
of negligence and therefore barred from now asserting his claim, which would
injure defendant bank by reducing dividends to depositors. Mattison-Greenlee
Service Corporation v. Culhane, (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 608.
A depositor generally is chargeable only with those payments made in conformity with his orders,1. but that is more acceptable as a starting point for discussion than as a reliable, immutable rule. An important qualification, simply
stated, is that its application is in practice dependent to some· extent upon the
reasonable conduct of the depositor. If the depositor knows about, or from the
available sources of information should have discovered, irregularities in his
account and yet fails to give reasonably prompt notice to the bank, the bank
will be relieved of liability, provided, of course, the bank was not negligent or the
loss might otherwise have been prevented.2 Whatever the theory by which this
result is explained,3 the more practical problem is to translate the vague require-

Shipman v. Bank of New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371 (1891).
Arant, "Forged Checks-The Duty of the Depositor to his Bank," 3 I YALE
L. J. 598 (1922); Leather Manufacturer's Nat. Bank v. Morgan, II7 U. S. 96, 6
S. Ct. 657 (1886).
3 The theories which have been applied are legion, among them being adoption,
ratification, and estoppel. As Arant has pointed out, however, "the objection that one
cannot ratify what he does not know of seems conclusive against the ratification theory."
Arant, "Forged Checks-The Duty of the Depositor to his Bank," 3 I YALE L. J.
598 at 625 (1922). Estoppel is acceptable as far as it goes, but its requirement of
affirmative proof of damage or prejudice to the bank has been regarded as an undesirable limitation. The right promptly to proceed against a forger is in itself valuable, for
even though the forger is insolvent or beyond reach, "others may become interested
in him and come to his assistance, who, after delay, may not do so." McNeely Co.
v. Bank of North America, 221 Pa. 588, 70 A. 891 (1908). And since quite dearly the
whole problem is simply one of requiring due diligence on the part of the depositor
where indispensable to prevention of loss, the duty theory, which, properly applied,
will every time induce a reasonable result, is to be preferred. In any event, "the
1.

2
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ment of "reasonable care" into specific acts. 4 From the numerous reported cases
it appears that the depositor is obliged at least to examine the vouchers and
statements returned to him by the bank from time to time,5 thus verifying the
correctness of the debits and credits in the statement with a view to detecting
forgeries and alterations.6 The duty may be delegated to and discharged by a
competent employee; there is conflict, however, on the question of constructive
knowledge when the delegate is himself the forger.7 Ordinarily the examination
does not extend to forged indorsements, since the depositor is not expected to
know the payee's signature.8 Where, as in the principal case, the problem arises
from a misapplication of funds intended for deposit, a forged indorsement as a
cause for suspicion does not enter the picture. But the depositor is bound to act
prudently, and failure to give reasonable attention to suspicious circumstances
of whatever source may give rise to a valid defense in the bank. 0 Although an
effect ••• is to recognize the business sense of an implied contractual obligation ••.."
32 HARV. L. REV. 287 (1919).
4
"It is not possible to give an exact definition of the term 'reasonable care.' All
that can be done is to refer to the decisions in which the question has arisen." BRADY,
BANK CHECKS, 2d ed., 293 (1926).
15
First Nat. Bank v. Allen, IOO Ala. 476, 14 So. 335 (1893); 6 ZOLLMAN,
BANKS AND BANKING,§ 4144 (1936); 5 MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING, § 284 (1932).
In Stump v. Bank of New York, 212 App. Div. 608, 209 N. Y. S. 396 (1925), three
steps are suggested: 1: Compare vouchers returned by the bank with check stubs;
2. Compare balance entered in the statement with balance in stub book; 3. Compare
returned vouchers with list of checks entered in the statement. For further aspects of
this matter, see 15 A. L. R. 159 (1921) and 67 A. L. R. II2l (1930).
11
The three months limitation statutes have uniformly been interpreted to apply
only "to facts ••• within the knowledge of the drawer at the time of the return of
the check to him, namely, whether his name has been forged, or the check raised, or the
name of the payee changed." Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home
Sav. Bank, 252 Mich. 163 at 171, 233 N. W. 185 (1930). Similar qualifications apply
to the usual receipt from the depositor. Ibid.
1
BRADY, BANK CHECKS, 2d ed., § 181 (1926); Detroit Piston Ring Co. v.
Wayne County & Home Sav. Bank, 252 Mich. 163, 233 N. W. 185 (1930).
8
Nat. Surety Co. v. Bank of Manhattan Co.; 133 Misc. 48, 231 N. Y. S. 389
(1928); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Albia State Bank, 214 Iowa 541, 239 N. W.
4, 242 N. W. 538 (1932); 67 A. L. R. II21 at n25 (1930).
9
"We will not say the maker never is required to look at the indorsements. If
as in the Erickson case [C. E. Erickson Co. v. Iowa Nat. Bank, 2Il Iowa 495, 230
N. W. 342 (1930)], the fifty checks had been further indorsed by Tschupp personally, showing all the money was going to or through him; if, as in the Detroit
Piston Ring case [Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Sav. Bank,
252 Mich. 163, 233 N. W. 185 (1930)], the expense of [plaintiff] had so unduly
increased as to attract attention; if the plaintiff had known of part of the forgeries
and failed to caution the trust company; if the forged indorsements had even been
crude and obviously all in the same handwriting-in any of these circumstances we
will concede arguendo there might be substance to this defense." American Sash
& Door Co. v. Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98 at 121, 56 S. W. (2d) 1034
(1932). See Arant, "Forged Checks-The Duty of the Depositor to his Bank,"
31 YALE L. J. 598 at 613, note 37 (1922). In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Nat. Bank of Denver, 95 Colo. 34, 32 P. (2d) 268 (1934), plaintiff could probably
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arguable point, certain facts in the principal case indicate that the depositor's
conduct was not necessarily unreasonable and that a decision in his favor might
not have been amiss.10 But possibly an explanation for an apparent extension of
the rule in this instance can be found in the court's feeling that a bank closed
for five years "may have a more appealing and persuasive argument than an
individual," especially when the depositor knew that the receiver had been
operating on the basis of the depositor's claim as filed several years before and
not containing the present claim.
James D. Ritchie

have detected nothing from the indorsements, but "there were in its exclusive possession sources of information which upon an audit would have revealed" errors in the
account.
10 E.g., defendant's admitted fault in giving cash to the agent and the recording
of only the net transactions in the passbook. This case clearly differs from those
wherein a fraudulent· clerk used names of former or .fictitious employees and from the
situation in Potts & Co. v. Lafayette Nat. Bank, z69 N. Y. 181, 199 N. E. 50
(1935), where "any employee who examined the statements would have discovered"
the discrepancy.

